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for this right remains relatively uncertain under current international law.
A related, and, perhaps, more controversial issue, is that of remedial secession.
International law does not recognise a right to independence to sub-national groups.
If, however, one accepts that these groups have the right to internal selfdetermination, what would happen if they fell victim of serious injustices such as, for example, the systematic violation of their basic human rights? According to some authors, in such extreme circumstances these groups should be entitled to a right to independence as a last resort.
12 From a moral perspective, this would arguably represent the most sensible solution. In practical terms, however, this means that some secessionist claims could still be ultimately validated, in violation of the principle of constituted a major development in the international law of self-determination. 15 The key provision of the UNDRIP concerning self-determination is found in Article 3, which affirms that:
'indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. This is a straightforward endorsement of the right of self-determination for indigenous peoples. Against the uncertainties that surround the scope of self-determination under international law, it becomes important to determine the exact meaning and implications of this provision. Does it confer on indigenous peoples a full right of self-determination, including a right to secession, or, at least, to remedial secession?
Or does it simply refer to a right of 'internal' self-determination? And, in the latter case, what would this practically mean for indigenous peoples?
This article will seek to answer the above questions by examining the drafting history of Article 3 of the UNDRIP and positioning it within the (broader) normative context of the Declaration. The next two sections will examine the different ways in which indigenous peoples and States approached the question of self-determination during the negotiation process. In doing so, they will discuss whether the UNDRIP is compatible with an expansive reading of self-determination which would also include a right to secession. Section four, instead, will focus specifically on remedial secession, seeking to assess the UNDRIP's overall position on this contentious issue.
After that, section five will explore the actual meaning of the indigenous right to selfdetermination, highlighting its 'internal' character and strong relationship with participatory rights. Finally, section six will seek to draw some final conclusions on the potential and limits of this understanding of self-determination for indigenous peoples.
The Right of Self-Determination in the 1993 UN Draft Declaration on the

Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Despite the predictable difficulties in obtaining an express recognition of the right of self-determination, the indigenous peoples' representatives who took part in the negotiations on the UNDRIP were not prepared to accept any compromise on this particular issue. Indeed, that self-determination was central to their claims became clear since the very beginning of the drafting process, which was initiated in the mid 1980s by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP). 16 As soon as the WGIP commenced considering the content of a declaration on indigenous rights, a 16 The WGIP was a subsidiary body of the (then) Sub-Commission 
The Gradual Restriction of the Indigenous Right of Self-Determination
After adopting it, in 1994, the UN Sub-Commission for Prevention of Discrimination As discussed in the previous section, the majority of States felt that Article 3 posed too serious a threat to their territorial integrity. A group of States, taking a more radical position, opposed the very idea of recognizing the right of self-determination to indigenous peoples. 27 Another group, larger in number, took a more progressive approach. Crucially, they were prepared to recognize that indigenous peoples had the right of self-determination. However, they were also concerned about the way in which the draft declaration dealt with this right. Accordingly, in order to preserve the strong language of Article 3, they requested that additional paragraphs aimed at clarifying the meaning of indigenous self-determination be included in the text. 28 In particular, they suggested the introduction of specific passages on the inviolable principle of territorial integrity, and the promotion of a combined reading of former Article 31 (now Article 4) on the right to autonomy and Article 3. 29 As a result of these changes, the indigenous right of self-determination would be essentially equated with 'internal' self-determination, despite Article 3's literal endorsement of a full right. 30 Although many indigenous representatives were willing to discuss some of these proposals, a final agreement could not be reached. This is so because the proposed amendments would ultimately qualify, either directly or indirectly, the indigenous right of self-determination, something which indigenous peoples had always resisted. declaration, which established that 'nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their right of self-determination.' In the Chairman's proposal, the passage 'exercised in conformity with international law' was added to the relevant paragraph.
The intention of the Chairman was to introduce an indirect reference to the principle of territorial integrity. States, however, would have welcomed a direct and express reference to this principle.
The second, and more significant, change consisted of moving the provision on the right to autonomy, originally included in Article 31 of the draft declaration, directly after Article 3. 32 The repositioning of this provision obviously aimed at promoting a combined reading of the two articles, suggesting that the indigenous right of self-determination should be read essentially as a right to autonomy. That said, it is not difficult to understand why this amendment alone could hardly satisfy the more diffident States. If indigenous self-determination really meant nothing more than autonomy, then the very existence of Article 3 would become superfluous. Instead, the co-existence of these two provisions could suggest that, although the indigenous right of self-determination should be substantially implemented by means of autonomous settings, it transcends the limited scope of autonomy.
Despite acknowledging that a number of States were not fully satisfied with his proposal, the Chairman of the WGDD decided to submit his revised version of the draft declaration to the Human Rights Council, which adopted it on its first session in June 2006. 33 Regrettably, the text could not be adopted by consensus. 34 It is telling that, in their explanations of the vote, several States made direct references to Article 3, either expressing their concern with this provision, or specifying the way in which they understood it. All this clearly indicated that the question of self-determination had yet to be fully resolved.
32 It should also be noted that, whereas the original version of the article used the expression 'as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination', the final wording of Article 4 preferred the expression 'in exercising their right to self-determination', thus promoting a more restricted reading of the right. 
The Solution: Article 46(1)
In view of the above considerations, it is clear that, when the text of the declaration reached the General Assembly, there existed a certain discrepancy between the way in which the majority of States understood the indigenous right of self-determination, and the way in which this right was articulated in the document. More precisely, whereas States had made it very clear during the sessions of the WGDD that they could only accept indigenous self-determination inasmuch as this meant 'internal' self-determination, the text of the declaration endorsed an unqualified version of the right that made no distinction between its internal and external dimensions. Having said that, the UNDRIP's approach to self-determination is obviously innovative in another important respect. This instrument has created an indigenousspecific right of self-determination. 40 The two key features of this right are that, first, it only applies to indigenous peoples, and, secondly, it does not include a right to independence. These restrictions clearly respond to the concerns of States that were highlighted in section two above. Whilst their significance should not be overlooked, the fact remains that the UNDRIP has broken new ground in the international law of self-determination. In fact, regardless of the limitations placed by Article 46(1), the UNDRIP is the first international legal instrument to have explicitly extended the right of (internal) self-determination to a sub-national group. As to the specificity of this right, it is apparent that the provisions of the UNDRIP are only meant to apply to a particular category of sub-national groups, that is, indigenous peoples. 41 Once established that the indigenous right of self-determination has an internal dimension, 42 it is important to shed some light on the actual meaning of this right.
Before doing so, however, one final point remains to be considered. While it is fairly evident that the UNDRIP does not confer on indigenous peoples a right to independence under 'normal' conditions, could it be argued that it does so under 'special' circumstances? Section one above highlighted that the existence of a right to remedial secession under current international law is at best doubtful. By discussing the way in which the UNDRIP approaches this issue, the next section will also examine whether this instrument has made any significant contribution to the current debate concerning this controversial right.
The UNDRIP and Remedial Secession
There is considerable support among academics for a last measure right of remedial secession in case of serious violations of human rights. 43 A number of judicial and quasi-judicial pronouncements have also referred to this possibility, contributing to the perception that this right is gaining increasing recognition at the international level. The first point that needs to be made is that the UNDRIP makes no express reference to remedial secession. Nevertheless, there are a number of passages within the text that may help to shed light on the Declaration's approach to this controversial issue. Article 46(1) offers some initial guidance in this respect. It should be recalled that this provision establishes that: ' [n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, peoples, group or person any right to engage in any activities or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.'
As one can note, this passage resembles the safeguard clause contained in the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations that was discussed above. However, contrary to the latter, Article 46(1) provides for no exception to the protection of the principle of territorial integrity. Crucially, the reference to the obligation of a government to 'represent the whole people of the territory' is absent. Accordingly, it could be argued that Article 46(1) de facto rules out the possibility that indigenous peoples have a right to remedial secession. 50 This conclusion, however, is not fully convincing.
A first complication derives from a reference found in the preamble to the Declaration. More precisely, preambular paragraph sixteenth acknowledges that, in accordance with, inter alia, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Vienna Declaration), all peoples have the right to self-determination. 51 Crucially, the Vienna Declaration includes and expands the safeguard clause found in the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations. After recognizing that all peoples have the right to self-determination, it establishes that:
50 One could also argue that if, as noted above, the safeguard clause included in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations cannot be taken to indicate the existence of a right to remedial secession for subnational groups, in the same way the lack of a reference thereto cannot be taken to indicate the exclusion of such right. However, since this safeguard clause is widely regarded as the legal basis for the right to remedial secession, it is appropriate to discuss it in the context of a potential right to remedial secession for indigenous peoples. Another consideration that needs to be made is that the right of selfdetermination is part of the international human rights framework. While the denial of a right to secession under 'normal' circumstances may be regarded as an acceptable limitation to the right, it is more difficult to argue the same point with regard to 'special' circumstances. A human rights approach to this question would suggest that sub-national groups should have a right to remedial secession when this may serve the purpose of preventing or putting an end to widespread human suffering.
In conclusion, the presumption, based on the language of right, leaving practically unchanged its status under current international law.
The Internal Dimension of the Indigenous Right of Self-Determination
Once established that indigenous peoples have the right to internal self-determination, the next, difficult, step consists of implementing this right. It is generally recognized that courts and court-like bodies can importantly contribute to the process of implementation of international human rights norms and standards. 54 This process can be substantially facilitated by the existence of identifiable yardsticks against which to measure the level of compliance with a human rights provision. In this sense, the way in which self-determination is understood bears important consequences for its overall effectiveness.
Having said that, to identify the exact, and practical, meaning of the indigenous right of self-determination is no easy task. This right has been defined, among others, as the right of indigenous peoples to 'freely pursue their political, economic, and social developments within the frameworks of their respective
States.' 55 Evidently, the scope and implications of such a broadly defined right can be extensive and particularly difficult to spell out. In addition, a certain degree of flexibility is required in light of the heterogeneous category of indigenous peoples.
Realistically, the way in which self-determination is exercised by the various indigenous groups of the world will have to take into account the important historical, political, and socio-economic differences that exist among them. 56 Indeed, it has even been suggested that the implementation and application of Article 3 of the UNDRIP not only cannot but also should not be uniform. 57 The need to approach the indigenous right of self-determination with a certain degree of flexibility does not necessarily have negative consequences on its effectiveness, provided that a common specifically, it also pointed out that self-determination is the normative framework for the indigenous collective right to participation. 63 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, has also recognized the important link between the two principles. Among other things, he regularly seeks to promote the participatory rights of indigenous peoples by reference to their right of selfdetermination. Thus, relying on the self-determination framework, he has called upon
States to promote broader cooperation with indigenous peoples in relation to extractive industries, 64 to encourage indigenous self-governance at the local level, footing equal to that of all others. 66 The connection between self-determination and participatory rights is nowhere clearer than in the UNDRIP, which, as noted by Burger, 'is focused emphatically on the application of the right of indigenous peoples to participate.' 67 More specifically, Quane has observed that the close relationship between self-determination and participation represents 'one of the most interesting and innovative aspects of the UNDRIP.' 68 In fact, more than twenty articles of the Declaration can be generally related to the idea of participation in decision-making. 70 Autonomy can be in itself a complicated concept to define. In fact, as suggested by Heintze, its concrete content should be determined in every special case. 71 However, the important point is that autonomy also represents a special form of participation, namely one that allows sub-national groups, in this case indigenous peoples, to exercise direct control over affairs that specifically affect them. preserve the full recognition of their right of self-determination. An understanding of self-determination that not only fails to recognize their right to secession, but, also, downplays the relevance of their right to remedial secession may, therefore, be considered unfair. 78 Secondly, and, perhaps, more importantly, some doubts may arise as to whether the connection between self-determination and participation effectively contributes to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and guarantee that their development will take place in accordance with their aspirations and needs. In other words, it is unclear whether indigenous peoples will be able to exercise these rights in any meaningful and fruitful way.
The above concerns are legitimate and cannot be simply dismissed. However, focusing on participatory rights seems to represent a valuable option within those realistically available. As discussed in section three, ways of exercising the right of self-determination that impair the political unity and territorial integrity of States are prohibited by Article 46(1) of the UNDRIP. However, it was also noted that the UNDRIP cannot be read as excluding a right to remedial secession altogether.
Furthermore, the participatory rights recognized to indigenous peoples are different from those enshrined in other international human rights instruments. Firstly, they are more extensive, and, secondly, they are accepted as collective rights. 79 These features crucially enhance the overall value of these rights. The legal regime that regulates the land rights of indigenous peoples offers a good example of how indigenous participatory rights, embedded in the self-determination discourse, can effectively work in practice. The next section will discuss this in relation to States' obligations to engage in a constructive dialogue with indigenous peoples before launching or implementing development projects on their lands.
The Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Context of Participatory Rights
Indigenous peoples have a distinctive and profound relationship with their lands, territories and resources. This special relationship, aptly recognized under current international human rights law, must be specially protected in order to guarantee the In this sense, the principle of FPIC becomes a vital component of the indigenous right of self-determination, suggesting that strong participatory rights, operating within a solid indigenous rights regime, can bring important benefits to indigenous peoples. This is especially true considering the significance of land rights for these peoples, and the fact that, in the past, economic and industrial development took place without recognition of and respect for indigenous peoples' cultural attachment to their lands.
Conclusions
The right of peoples to self-determination is commonly described as one of the most controversial norms of international law. Two questions have traditionally dominated the intense debate concerning the scope and meaning of this right: first, who constitutes a 'people' for the purposes of self-determination, and, secondly, what does this right actually imply for its legitimate holders. These two questions become particularly relevant in the context of sub-national groups' claims for selfdetermination. Are these groups 'peoples' entitled to the right of self-determination?
And, if so, do they have a right to secession? In the colonial context, this right certainly implied the possibility that specific categories of peoples, namely those of non-self-governing territories and those subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, could become independent. This, however, never meant that segments of a population were entitled to the same right. In the postcolonial period, the right to self-determination has been gradually recognized to all peoples, with a crucial distinction being introduced between an internal and external form of exercising such right. While self-determination continued to remain linked to independence, it also acquired a continuing character, so that peoples could exercise this right even within the existing borders of a State. This new development contributed, in part, to make the sub-national groups' claims for self-determination more acceptable to States.
However, States' concerns about their territorial integrity have prevented a clear and definitive endorsement of self-determination for these specific groups.
Against this background, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) breaks new ground in the international law of self-determination.
It is the first international legal instrument that expressly recognizes that one peoples. This is so because indigenous self-determination has been clearly construed as a right that does not imply a right to independence. Secondly, doubts may arise as to the effectiveness of participatory rights, and particularly whether they can guarantee that the dialogue between indigenous peoples and States will be on an equal footing.
All considered, there are reasons to believe that indigenous participatory rights, as understood in the UNDRIP in the context of self-determination, can produce some positive results. Firstly, the focus on participation does not necessarily imply the exclusion of other forms of exercising self-determination under special circumstances.
More precisely, the text of the UNDRIP does not categorically rule out the possibility that indigenous peoples may enjoy a right to remedial secession. Thus, when participation cannot secure the respect of indigenous rights, more radical options can be explored. Secondly, participation can take different forms, including autonomy, which can offer valuable solutions to the problems of some indigenous groups.
Thirdly, the participatory rights enshrined in the UNDRIP are different from those traditionally recognized in other human rights instruments. The former are more extensive and are accepted as collective rights. In this important sense, the separating line between participation and (internal) self-determination tends to dissolve. In conclusion, although self-determination as participation has some limits, one should recognize its potential in protecting and empowering indigenous peoples.
While there is already evidence that this solution may bring some benefits to indigenous peoples, it is vital to monitor the future implementation of this right, both with respect to land rights and other areas of the indigenous rights regime, in order to preserve and further promote the continuation of this positive trend. 96 On this point, see Helen Quane, supra note 15, pp. 272-284.
